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Members of Congress are less loyal to their party closer to an
election, making a vote to authorize force against ISIL unlikely
before November.
Many commentators have expressed concern that Congress has not yet taken a formal vote to
authorize the use of military force against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIL). In new
research, René Lindstädt and Ryan J. Vander Wielen explore why Congress is so reluctant to
put issues such as this to a vote around election time. By analyzing party votes, where one party
votes in opposition to the other, they find that members are more likely to vote with their party
when elections are distant, but as they become nearer, this likelihood falls, as members become
concerned about electoral reprisals from their constituents. This means that party leaders are far
less likely to schedule highly partisan votes close to an election, for fear of losing votes and seats.
Despite the threats presented by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and U.S.
involvement in fighting the group, Congress has yet to take a formal vote to authorize U.S.
military involvement. If anything, Senate Democrats and House Republicans alike appear to have
little interest in taking up a vote prior to the November elections. Why is Congress reluctant to put
this weighty question to a vote?
In recent research, we argue that both chambers are trying to avoid presenting their members with difficult
choices close to the elections. In some races, like the North Carolina Senate race, this issue has been front-and-
center, putting incumbents in an uncomfortable spot between voters who oppose further military action in the
Middle East and those who believe that some action against ISIL is necessary. And neither party is immune to
these tensions. As a result, and despite the gravity and time-sensitivity of the situation, party leaders in Congress
accept that it is better to wait with the vote. House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) openly notes that he would
recommend a vote after the New Year if the U.S. were still involved in the effort at that time. Quite simply, a vote
after the election entails fewer risks to rank-and-file members and makes them more likely to support their party
leadership.
The electoral system in the U.S. has forced a very specific brand of partisanship on party leadership and rank-
and-file members. With few exceptions, most candidates still run for election on a major party ticket. As long as
parties have a well-defined brand, party labels provide meaningful information to voters, who use party labels as a
simple cue to evaluate candidates’ policy stances. At the same time, voters also have a strong dislike for
partisanship. They want their representatives to be independent and not too tightly bound to their parties. This
puts parties in a difficult position. They must exercise party discipline to make policy that sustains the party label,
but at the same time, must stay away from excessive demands of loyalty from their rank-and-file membership to
avoid alienating voters. Members of Congress and their parties have found a way to address these contradictory
mandates. The key is the timing of partisanship.
By analyzing party votes – votes in which a majority of one party votes in opposition to a majority of the other
party (i.e., party line votes) – within two-year congressional terms, we find that party discipline rises and falls
depending on how close votes are to Election Day. Specifically, members are willing to lend their party high levels
of loyalty when elections are distant, but temper that loyalty as elections approach. Figure 1 shows the change in
probability of a member voting with his/her party over the election cycle for party votes, which are most likely to
build a party brand but also result in electoral reprisal, and non-party votes, which do not present members with
this tension. The pattern we observe on party votes reflects recognition by members that party support has real
value, as well as real electoral consequences. By strategically timing their party loyalty, party members can
further the party brand and minimize individual electoral risk.
Figure 1 – Probability of member voting with party over the election cycle
What’s more, party leaders are willing to let the rank-and-file vote their (or their constituent’s) conscience in close
proximity to elections, since they seek to maximize the number of seats they hold in the chamber. They do this by
strategically adjusting the agenda with respect to elections. Party leaders refrain from scheduling highly partisan
votes when elections are near. Instead, contentious partisan votes that divide the parties are typically reserved for
the beginning of a new term, with the expectation that the rank-and-file will toe the party line at that time. This can
be seen in Figure 2, which shows the precipitous fall in the probability of party votes over the election cycle. Such
appears to be the fate of the ISIL authorization vote. This arrangement works because voters have short-term
memories and tend to more heavily weigh recent legislative behavior. Moreover, media scrutiny of legislative
activity tends to be very different depending on the time in the election cycle.
Figure 2 – Probability of party votes over the election cycle
This article is based on the paper, ‘Dynamic Elite Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the US
House’, in the British Journal of Political Science.
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